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Abstract
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) was signed into law on February
18, 2005. Prior to CAFA, plaintiffs found it easier for class action lawsuits to be tried in
their preferred venue—state courts. Changes introduced by CAFA practically removed
the majority of class action jurisdiction from state to federal courts. Since law and
regulation might serve as an external corporate governance mechanism, an interesting
question is whether CAFA has strengthened or weakened corporate governance. If
CAFA improves corporate governance, associated marginal benefits would outweigh
marginal costs. The opposite would be true if CAFA weakens corporate governance.
This issue was hotly debated in the US Congress. The proponents argued that CAFA
would reduce costs for the affected firms, while opponents argued the opposite.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine which side of the debate is
reflected in market reactions to various events that either enhanced or reduced the
chances of the passage of CAFA. We identify the firms that are most likely to be
affected by CAFA and find that the overall market reaction for these firms is positive
when the likelihood of CAFA passage increases, while the reaction has been negative
when the chance of its passage diminishes. We also hypothesize that firms that are
more likely to be exposed to product liability litigation would experience a significantly
higher (positive or negative) abnormal return than firms that are more likely to be
involved in contract liability law suits. The results support this hypothesis. We also
examine potential factors that might explain cross-sectional variations in abnormal
returns and find that duality of Chairmanship and CEO has negative impact, while the
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firm’s debt ratio and analysts’ following have positive impact on abnormal returns.
Finally, based on our findings that the transfer of class action jurisdiction from state to
federal courts is favorably received by stockholders, we argue that state courts are
unfavorable forums for corporate defendants. We test this proposition by examining
market reaction to events of class action cases being remanded to state courts.
Consistent with this proposition, we find significantly negative market reactions to this
event.

Keywords: Class Action Fairness, Regulatory Event, SUR, Event Study
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1.INTRODUCTION
The Class Action Fairness Act of 20051 (CAFA) that became effective as of
February 18, 2005 has been the most significant change to United States class action
law in over 40 years.2 Prior to CAFA, two conditions had to be concurrently met to keep
a class-action case from falling under the federal jurisdiction. The first condition stated
that the amount in controversy must not exceed $75,000 per class member, although
the aggregate amount had no ceiling. The second required complete diversity,
situations where plaintiffs and defendants must be citizens of different states.
Proponents of CAFA successfully argued that the loopholes in the jurisdictional
requirements allowed plaintiffs’ attorneys to justify class-action cases being tried in
“more friendly” state or local courts where corporate defendants were forced to settle
claims out of court or risk large judgments in these courts. Consequently, consumers
rarely benefited while the attorneys collected extraordinary fees. Certification
requirements, as a result of CAFA, were changed to include class action litigation
involving parties with minimal diversity or claims exceeding $5 million in aggregate.
These changes practically removed the majority of class action jurisdiction from state to
federal courts.
Law and regulation serve as an external corporate governance mechanism by
imposing discipline on the firm in order to protect stakeholders such as shareholders,
consumers, employees and the environment (see Gillan, 2006).3 A relevant question,

1

The bill passed the U.S. Senate on February 10, 2005 and the U.S. House of Representatives on
February 17, 2005. President Bush signed the legislation into law.
2
The Act also applies to mass actions. When referring to class action litigation, we are also referring to
mass actions.
3
Gillan (2006) discusses corporate governance in terms of internal and external components. He then
divides external governance into five broad categories: law and regulation; markets for corporate control;
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therefore, is whether CAFA has strengthened or weakened this aspect of corporate
governance. If stockholders of the firms that are more likely to be affected by CAFA
believe that the act has strengthened (benefits outweigh costs) corporate governance,
the market reaction to steps leading to (and including) the eventual passage of this bill
will be positive. The opposite should be true if stockholders believe that CAFA would
weaken (costs outweigh benefits) corporate governance.
Whether CAFA would make corporate governance more efficient (reduce costs)
or less efficient (increase cost) was a hotly debated issue during the legislative
deliberation process that eventually led to its adoption. The proponents argued that the
rent seeking trial lawyers “game” the legal system by constructing class action litigation
that would find its way into friendly state courts resulting in frivolous litigation that
causes a drain on the economy.4 The argument goes on to suggest that Federal courts
are more careful adjudicators, are less likely to certify class actions, and provide closer
scrutiny of frivolous claims and therefore, CAFA would prevent forum sopping by class
action trial lawyers.5 Consequently, CAFA should reduce costs by avoiding unnecessary
litigations, thus benefitting all stakeholders. On the other hand, the opponents argued
that the adoption of CAFA might weaken the corporate governance and result in higher
costs. Their arguments go as follows. First, CAFA might actually weaken the power of
litigation by potentially eliminating an extra layer of legal protection (i.e., removal of state
markets for capital information; markets for accounting financial and legal services; and private sources
for external oversight such as media and external lawsuits.
4
Anecdotal evidence was presented regarding the miscarriage of justice as small town pharmacists told
of the stress and burdens placed upon them by being named as defendants in litigation directed at deep
pocketed pharmaceutical firms.
5
Congressional testimony referred to the problem of “home cooking”, “jackpot justice,” and “judicial
hellholes.” The term “judicial hellhole” comes from the name of an annual report published by the
Americans for Tort Reform Association. Orleans Parish is hailed in past reports as a “judicial hellhole”.
Source: Congressional Testimony from the Legislative History of the Class Action Fairness Act
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court venues). Second, Federal judicial system has been and continues to experience a
shortage of judges. As such, it may take longer to move cases through a backlogged
federal judiciary. (Appendix A provides the list of pending cases with the Federal
courts.) Senator Ted Kennedy spoke in opposition noting, “The difference in the
amount of time it takes to adjudicate a State court age discrimination case compared to
a Federal court case may be as much as 2 years. No wonder the corporate defendants
are salivating over this opportunity to escape their wrongs” (Senate Floor Debate on
S.5, Feb 8, 2005). Third, information asymmetries that exist between managers and
stakeholders (such as shareholders or consumers) decrease as more information is
divulged. CAFA, by potentially removing state venues, might impair such information
flow as the legal discovery process diminishes. In this paper we examine which view of
CAFA’s role as a corporate governance mechanism is reflected in the market reaction
to various events surrounding the passage of CAFA.
Previous financial economics research documents market reactions to such
events as changes in corporate regulatory environments and the filing or resolution of
corporate litigation6. This paper contributes to the literature by subjecting CAFA to
similar analysis. Our main purpose is to investigate the market reaction to events that
we identify as likely to increase or decrease the likelihood of passage. The investigation
begins by examining the market reaction of three groups of firms over the event days:
(1) firms that actively lobbied for the act; (2) firms that are more likely to be impacted by
the intent of the legislation; and (3) firms that are less likely to be impacted by the
passage of the law. We hypothesize that the market reaction will be less pronounced for
6

See Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) for an analysis of Sarbanes Oxley and Haslem (2005) who
examines the role of managerial opportunism in litigation settlement.
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group 3 than group 2. We then investigate what firm characteristics (including internal
corporate governance tools, information asymmetry and other pertinent firm
characteristics) explain the cross sectional variations in firms’ cumulative abnormal
returns. Our final empirical examination involves testing the underlying premise of CAFA
proponents, mainly that state courts are unfavorable forums for corporate defendants.
We do this by examining pre CAFA price effects around forum changes when class
action cases are remanded to state court.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
background on the developments leading to CAFA and compares the filing
determinants before and after CAFA. Section 3 presents a literature review regarding
abnormal returns around litigation events as well as regulatory changes. Section 4
develops hypotheses and Section 5 describes the methodology. Section 6 reports
findings, while Section 7 summarizes the results and presents concluding remarks.
2.CAFA--BACKGROUND
CAFA made its first legislative appearance in 1997 and it was approximately
eight years later that the final bill passed. It was the first piece of legislation addressed
by Congress at the beginning of President Bush’s second term in office. It was passed
three months after the 2004 congressional elections that resulted in an increase in the
republican senatorial majority.
2.1. Jurisdictional Determinants: Pre-CAFA period
Federal courts adjudicate cases related to federal statutes, or U.S.
Constitution, or when the federal government is a litigating party. Generally, local issues
and causes of action derived from state laws are adjudicated in state courts. However,
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federal courts do have jurisdiction over state claims when actions are brought involving
diversity of citizenship. This occurs when issues arise under state law between parties
that are citizens of different states. Federal jurisdiction exists and applies state law in
order to provide a safeguard against any bias that may exist between a local court and
an out of state party.7 Prior to CAFA, two conditions had to be simultaneously met for a
case to fall under federal jurisdiction. The first condition stated that the amount in
controversy must exceed $75,000. The second required complete diversity, situations
where plaintiffs and defendants must be citizens of different states.8
Federal courts of appeal held previously to CAFA that the amount in controversy
requirement applied to each class member. If each class participant claims less than
$75,000 in damages, other things equal, then federal jurisdiction would not apply.
Supporters of class action reform vigorously asserted that plaintiffs’ attorneys
strategically game the system in the following way. An entrepreneurial attorney might
come up with an idea for a class action or the cause of action may be derived from a
claimant. Realizing the potential of the claim, the attorney would seek a representative
class member from a state or a jurisdiction with a magnet court or a local defendant in a
state with a magnet court. In order to allay federal jurisdiction, damages would be
sought for less than $75,000 per class member. Applying this theory, one may have a
class action attorney from Pennsylvania filing a class action complaint against a
defendant corporation domiciled in Delaware in an Illinois state court. Reformers were
quick to point out the apparent contradiction in the system whereby the Louisiana
7

For example, a Louisiana resident involved in a slip and fall in Alabama may have the right to have their
claim tried in either Alabama state court or a federal district court.
8
In the preceding example if the injured party pleads greater than $75,000 in damages and each party is
domiciled in a different state, federal jurisdiction would apply.

5

resident injured in Alabama claiming $75,000 in damages would fall under federal
jurisdiction, while the case of thousands of class members from different states with an
aggregate claim in the billions of dollars would be decided in a state court.9
2.2. Jurisdictional Determinants: Post-CAFA Period
A major argument against the class-action law prevailing in the pre-CAFA period
was that it allowed plaintiff’s counsel to shop (“forum shopping”) for the most
advantageous venue. The venue is also described as “magnet” court10 because, the
proponents of CAFA argued that, this court, where judges are elected, makes it easier
for the plaintiff’s attorney to obtain class-action certification.
Congressional proponents of class action reform cited four main abuses related
to class action certification. The abuses were identified as (1) sympathetic state courts
being predisposed to certify class action litigation; (2) state courts certifying national
class actions and applying one state’s law to all class members regardless of their
home jurisdictions; (3) multiple “copycat” class action filings, and (4) class action
settlements providing little or no relief to class members, but incurring considerable
attorneys’ fees. This argument ultimately prevailed and subsequently Congress chose
to address the issue by altering the jurisdictional requirements for class action venues.
9

Class action litigation falls under Rule 2316 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23(a) sets
forth requirements regarding numerosity of the class, commonality of the questions of law and the
adequacy of class representation as it relates to protecting the interests of the class. In addition to the
conditions set forth in 23(a) at least one condition of 23(b) must be met. Rule 23(b) requires that (1) the
individual prosecution of separate claims may lead to inconsistent adjudications with the potential to
create incompatible standards of conduct for the opposing party to the class (2) the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act in a manner applicable to the entire class (3) questions of law or fact are
found to be common to all members of the class and override any individual differences of class
members. Most states have adopted rules similar to 23(a) and 23(b) above. If an action arises that meets
the requirements set forth in 23(a) and 23(b) then class certification may be warranted. The ultimate
forum for the adjudication of the class action depends on whether or not the members of the class exceed
the amount in controversy and the degree of diversity between class members and defendants.
10
Magnet courts were usually located in counties with small populations with state court judges who were
elected rather than appointed as in the federal judiciary.
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CAFA brought about the expansion of federal jurisdiction by introducing three
major changes to the Pre-CAFA law. First, CAFA adopted a minimal diversity threshold
in contrast to complete diversity. Previously a requirement for removal of a class action
from state to federal court was that all plaintiffs had to be diverse from all defendants,
i.e. all plaintiffs and all defendants had to be citizens of different states. Minimal diversity
allows class actions to be removed as long as at least one defendant is a citizen of a
different state than one plaintiff. Second, in further expansion of federal jurisdiction,
CAFA allows for removal when aggregate class claims exceed $5 million. This was a
departure from the Supreme Court’s previous precedent disallowing the aggregation of
individual claims to meet the amount in controversy criterion. Third, other characteristics
of CAFA stipulate that the named defendant must be the “real” target of the action. For
instance, naming a local insurance agent will not circumvent minimal diversity if the
majority of potential damages come from an out of state parent firm. The changes
enacted by CAFA practically remove the majority of class action jurisdiction from state
to federal courts.11 Figure 1 summarizes pre and post CAFA jurisdictional determinants.

In order to keep class actions in state courts when state issues outweigh federal issues, the law allows
two exceptions. One is referred to as the “Local Controversy” exception prohibiting removal when the
“substantial majority” of class members and the “primary defendants” are both citizens of the state where
the action is filed. In this case a federal district court may decline jurisdiction if (1) greater than two thirds
of the proposed plaintiff class are citizens of the of the state where the action was filed and (2) at least
one defendant is a defendant from whom significant relief is sought whose alleged conduct is the basis
for the action and who is a citizen of the state where the action was filed and (3) principal injuries from the
conduct of each defendant occurred in the state where the action was filed. The “Home State” exception
declines federal jurisdiction if two thirds or more of the proposed plaintiff class and the primary defendants
are citizens of the state where the action was filed.

11
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Figure 1: Filing Determinants—State vs. Federal
Panel 1. The following diagram shows the filing determinants during the pre-CAFA
period. All federal questions of law are filed in federal district courts. If there is a state
issue there must be a determination made regarding diversity of citizenship. If all
plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of different states then the matter falls under
federal jurisdiction. If at least one plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of the same
state, then a determination must be made regarding the amount in controversy. If the
amount in controversy is less than $75,000 per class member the issue is allowed to
move forward in state court.

Class Action Alleged

Jurisdictional Question

State
Diversity Question

Federal
Complete

US Federal Court

Greater than $75,000 per Class Member
Amount In Controversy

State Court
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Figure 1: Filing Determinants—State vs. Federal (continued)
Panel 2. The diagram below depicts filing determinants as a result of CAFA. All federal
questions of law are filed in federal district courts. If there is a state issue there must be
a determination made regarding diversity of citizenship. If any plaintiff and defendant
are citizens of different states then the matter falls under federal jurisdiction. If the
amount in controversy is greater than $5 million in aggregate, then federal jurisdiction
applies.

Class Action Alleged

Jurisdictional Question

State
Diversity Question

Federal
Minimal

US Federal Court

$5 Million Aggregate
Amount in Controversy

State Court
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1. Market Reactions to Legislative Changes
Several studies exist in literature that examines the market reaction to regulatory
changes. Although these papers are not directly related to CAFA, their results and
methodology have implications for our study. Schipper and Thompson (1983) measure
the economic impact of merger related regulatory changes from 1966-1970. They
consider the Williams Amendments, the 1969 Tax Reform Act, the Accounting
Principles Board Opinions 16 and 17 as well as SEC disclosure rules. They find that
market reactions to the Williams Amendments are unequivocally negative.
In an examination of 20 regulatory changes from 1887 to 1978, Binder (1985)
examines shareholder reaction to regulatory changes. The regulatory changes are
described as classic price-entry type--job or consumer safety, environmental quality,
and the nationalization of rail transportation. The regulatory events chosen occur over a
long period of time and there are no clear demarcations as to when market expectations
change regarding the regulatory events. He employs both daily and monthly return data.
Excess returns are measured for all announcement months and also the most important
announcement month. The null hypothesis is rejected about as often as if by chance.
Similar results are found using daily returns. Binder points out difficulties in measuring
abnormal returns when event periods are not clearly defined or when market
expectations are such that the regulatory event is partially or completely anticipated. He
finds that when events are not completely unanticipated in the methodology, the results
will not reject some of the null hypotheses as might be warranted. Binder concludes that
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finding no impact on stock prices does not warrant a conclusion that a regulation is
ineffective.
Ali and Kallapur (2001) examine the impact of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 and focus on the computer, electronics, pharmaceutical, biotech
and retailing industries. Their initial finding is similar to that of previous studies in that
shareholders react positively to the act. However, after performing price reversal tests
and taking into account additional confounding legislative events, they find that market
reaction to this act is indeed negative. Griffin et al. (2004) study investor responses to
news of class action securities fraud, the disclosure of the accounting restatement and
the date that the fraud allegedly begins. Mean excess returns are -16.6%, -4.1% and
3.6% for the end of the class period date, the class action filing date, and the beginning
of the class period date respectively.
Smith, Bradley and Jarrell (1986) use the OPEC increase in oil prices along with
U.S. regulatory price controls to examine the effects of the 1973 oil crisis on portfolios of
petroleum industry firms. They incorporate firm specific characteristics into a market
model estimated using seemingly unrelated regression methodology. By incorporating
firm operating characteristics into the estimation procedure they conclude they have
removed a potentially confounding factor in estimating abnormal returns within an
industry. Allen and Wilhelm (1988) investigate the inter-industry effects of The 1980
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act on portfolios of nonFederal Reserve System Banks, Federal Reserve System Banks as well as Savings
and Loans. They find that Federal Reserve System Banks have significantly positive
abnormal returns, while non-Federal Reserve System Banks and Savings and Loans
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had negative abnormal returns. In a similar vein, Cornett and Tehranian (1990)
examine the impact of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.
Specifically, they examine portfolios comprised of large and small savings and loans as
well as large and small commercial banks. They find that shareholders of large
commercial banks and savings and loans experienced positive excess returns while
shareholders of small commercial banks and savings and loans experienced negative
excess returns.
A number of studies have examined the market reaction and shareholder wealth
effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 including Li, Pincus and Rego (2008),
Jain and Rezaee (2006) and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007). In pre-SOX studies
involving corporate governance and firm value, critics cite an endogeneity problem
involving the firm’s choice of corporate governance. As an external corporate
governance mandate, changes brought about by SOX provide a unique event to study
the relationship between firm value and changes in corporate governance. Li et al.
(2008) focus on the relationship between event period abnormal returns for events
associated with SOX and the extent of earnings management. They find that the extent
of earnings management and event abnormal returns are significantly and positively
related. They conclude that the market anticipated that SOX would constrain earnings
management and improve the quality of financial reporting of firms that had previously
managed earnings extensively. Jain and Rezzaee (2006) investigate the shareholder
wealth implications of events associated with SOX and then regress measures of
financial reporting, audit functions, corporate governance proxies and control variables
on CARs. They find positive (negative) market reactions to events that increased
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(decreased) the probability of passage of SOX. Firms with stronger corporate
governance, financial reporting and audit functions prior to the Act were more positively
impacted by the Act. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) hypothesize that low
compliance firms (in the pre-SOX period) outperform high compliance firms over the
entire event period associated with SOX. They group firms into portfolios along the main
provisional measures of the act. They use proxies for insider trading, financial reporting,
related party transactions, internal control systems and board committee independence.
Their results are consistent with the hypothesis: lower compliance firms outperform
higher compliance firms along most provisional groupings. Also, large firms earn
positive abnormal returns while small less compliant firms earn negative abnormal
returns.

3.2. On Cross Sectional Variations in Price Reaction
Several studies report that price reaction varies depending on, among other things,
the type of litigation and by the industry type of defending firms. Karpoff and Lott (1993)
test abnormal returns involving corporate fraud and crime involving stakeholders, the
government, financial reporting and regulatory violations. They focus on the kinds of
events where there is potential for repeated interaction between the tortfeasor and the
claimant. Cumulative abnormal returns are -1.58%. Furthermore financial reporting
frauds have the largest negative cumulative abnormal returns -4.66% while they report
insignificant findings for regulatory violations. The median loss in shareholder wealth is
$6.418 million. Estimated direct costs of litigation are 6.4% of shareholder wealth
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losses. Common stock losses are 100 times greater than the reported U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s guidelines for fraud. The authors ascribe the excess to reputational loss.
Bhagat, Bizjak and Coles (1998) examine the price reactions of defendant corporations
by litigation type and by the industry type of defending firms. They find that on average
defendants lose .97% of their market value of equity or approximately $15.96 million
upon the reaction to filing and settlement announcements. However, firms involved in
environmental, product liability and shareholder lawsuits experienced greater than
average negative abnormal returns (-3.08%, -1.46%, and -2.71% respectively) have
greater negative shareholder wealth implications than anti-trust or breach of contract (.81% and -.16 respectively). They also report that government plaintiffs tend to elicit the
largest negative impacts to shareholder wealth at -1.73%, while inter-firm and other
non-firm party reactions are -.75% and -.81% respectively.
In a later paper, Karpoff and Lott (1999) find statistically significant negative
average abnormal returns when announcements occur that indicate defendant firms are
involved in a lawsuit seeking punitive damages. In their analysis they examine how
firms engaged in litigation with punitive damage claims react when Supreme Court12
decisions addressing punitive damages are rendered. They find that while there are
some significantly positive results to firms engaged in litigation when legislative action
might impair the likelihood of punitive damages, they find punitive damages are difficult
to predict and have an insignificant effect on firm value. In some instances they find firm
value increases when an event decreases the likelihood of punitive damages, however
they also find evidence to the contrary.

12

Karpoff and Lott (1999) examine seven Supreme Court decisions involving punitive damage issues.
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Prince and Rubin (2002) find negative abnormal returns occur around the
announcement of lawsuits and initial market reactions approximate worst case
scenarios in product liability lawsuits. There is no evidence of reputational losses in the
sense that initial losses are greater than the potential costs of the litigation. Brown et al.
(2004) investigate events surrounding the deliberation and passage of the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002. They find negative abnormal returns in the banking,
construction, insurance, real estate investment trusts, transportation and public utilities.
Abnormal returns in property and casualty insurance are found to be value neutral at
best.
Haslem (2005) reports that abnormal returns are more sensitive for firms
involved in product liability lawsuits than those involved in contract lawsuits. That is
firms in product liability lawsuits have more positive abnormal returns for positive
litigation events and more negative abnormal returns for negative litigation events than
firms in contract litigation. Koku (2006) compares the abnormal returns associated with
a sample of non-class action litigation announcements with class action litigation
announcements and finds that class action litigation abnormal returns are twice those of
non-class action abnormal returns.
3.3. Literature Summary
The major findings based on our literature survey may be summarized as follows:
1.Regulatory changes impact firm value and the direction of impact depends
on what the legislation purports to accomplish.
2.The impact of regulatory changes may vary depending on a firm’s industry
affiliation, type of law suits, and type of plaintiff.
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4. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
4.1. On the Direction and Sensitivity of Price Reaction to CAFA
The existing literature establishes that the stock market responds to regulatory
changes. Thus we expect to find market reaction in response to CAFA as well.
However, the direction of this reaction is uncertain. On one hand, opponents argue that
CAFA might weaken an important weapon in the external corporate governance arsenal
by removal of state court venues. The opponents also argue that CAFA might induce
inefficiency in the legal system by 1) increasing delay in the judicial process as the
Federal judicial system, which is plagued by a shortage of judges, will further be
backlogged with additional cases (see appendix A), and 2) potentially impairing the flow
of information between firm management and its stakeholders as the process of legal
discovery is curtailed. If shareholders of CAFA-affected firms share this viewpoint, they
are likely to react negatively to the passage of CAFA.
On the other hand, proponents contend that CAFA will instead improve the
external corporate governance. They maintain that Federal courts are more careful
adjudicators and provide closer scrutiny of frivolous claims. The jurisdictional changes in
CAFA decrease the likelihood of corporate defendants finding themselves in state
courts which are more likely to certify class actions. This in turn will reduce the number
of unnecessary litigations and, therefore extensive litigation costs faced by defendant
firms. If shareholders of CAFA-affected firms share this viewpoint, they are likely to
react positively to the passage of CAFA. Thus, the direction (positive or negative) of
price impact in response to events leading to CAFA is uncertain and needs to be
empirically determined.
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Some firms are more sensitive than others to a specific type of lawsuits.
Literature provides ample examples of this asymmetric impact. For example, Bhagat,
Bizjak and Coles (1998) find the reaction to filing and settlement announcements is
significantly greater for firms involved in environmental, product liability and shareholder
lawsuits than those involved in anti-trust or breach of contract. Prince and Rubin (2002)
examine product liability lawsuit filings and reactions in the automobile and
pharmaceutical industries and find sympathetic decreases in firm value for competitors
in the automobile industry and positive reactions from competitors in the pharmaceutical
industry. Brown et. al. (2004) examine the impact of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002 in six industries and find negative abnormal returns in the banking, construction,
insurance, real estate investment trusts, transportation and public utilities but no
abnormal returns in property and casualty insurance.
It is reasonable to expect that firms that are prone to class-action suits are more
likely to be affected by CAFA events. Of the major type of lawsuits that a firm might be
exposed to--environmental, product liability, shareholder-related, contract liability, and
anti-trust--- CAFA is not applicable in anti-trust matters and is limited in such that it does
not apply to shareholder lawsuits. Also, CAFA contains the “Local Controversy” and
“Home State” exceptions which may effectively limit its reach in environmental class
actions. Therefore, firms more exposed to product liability or contract liability cases are
more likely to feel the impact of CAFA.
Haslem (2005) shows that firms in product liability lawsuits have more positive
abnormal returns for positive litigation events and more negative abnormal returns for
negative litigation events than firms in contract litigation. For example, firms in product
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liability lawsuits experience more positive or less negative abnormal returns upon
litigation settlement, firm wins and firm losses. Based on Haslem’s findings, we expect
firms more exposed to product liability suits are likely to be more sensitive to CAFA than
firms more exposed to contract liability suits This leads us to formulate the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Price reaction to CAFA has to be empirically determined.
Hypothesis 2. Price reaction to CAFA is more sensitive (more positive or more
negative) for firms that are principally involved in product liability cases than
those that are primarily involved in contract liability cases.

4.2. On the Cross-sectional Differences in Market Reaction for Firms within the
Same Industry
Abnormal returns resulting from CAFA are likely to vary among firms within the
firms involved in product liability (and contract liability) lawsuits depending on firm
characteristics. In this context, a firm’s internal corporate governance mechanism might
play an important role along with a tool of external corporate governance (regulatory
reform, such as CAFA). In this vein, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) compare the
abnormal returns over the entire event period associated with SOX between low
compliance and high compliance firms. They form groups using proxies for the main
provisional measures of the act---insider trading, financial reporting, related party
transactions, internal control systems and board committee independence.
Chhaochharia and Grinstein report that lower compliance firms outperform higher
compliance firms along most provisional groupings. Also, large firms earn positive
abnormal returns while small less compliant firms earn negative abnormal returns. This
leads us to to develop the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 3. Other factors, including internal corporate governance structure,
are likely to explain the cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns for firms
within the same industry.

5. EVENT, SAMPLE, METHODOLOGY, & DATA
5.1. Defining Event Dates
The Legislative History of The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 provides a
2,654 page summary of the Class Action Fairness Act from its initial filing through its
final passage in February of 2005. This document contains all Congressional
deliberations, discussions, hearing, and testimony for the 1999-2005 period. Table 1
compiles legislative action dates based on this document. Panel 1 of Table 1 lists the
pertinent dates for the US Senate, while Panel 2 does the same for the US House of
Representatives. We use Table 1 and perform a Lexis-Nexis search to determine the
final list of event dates for our paper. We choose only those events that either increase
or decrease the chances of CAFA being passed.
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Table 1: Legislative History of the Class Action Fairness Act
This table enumerates the legislative history of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. The analysis that
follows focuses on the period subsequent to October 23, 2003 when the legislation focused to address
forum shopping.

Panel 1: U.S. Senate
Date
October 30, 1997
September 28, 1998
February 2, 1999
May 4, 1999
June 29, 2000
November 15, 2001
July 30, 2002
February 4, 2003
April 11, 2003
October 17,2003
October 23,2003
February 10, 2004
July 7, 2004
July 8, 2004
January 25, 2005
February 3, 2005
February 10, 2005

Event
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts Hearing
“Class Action Fairness Act of 1997” approved by the Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts, S.2083 introduced by Senators Grassley (R-IA) and Kohl(D-WI)
“The Class Action Fairness Act of 1999” introduced by Senators Grassley and Thurmond
(R-SC) S.353
Legislative Hearing
Senate Judiciary Committee Approves S.353
S.1712 Introduced
Senate Judiciary discusses S.1712 during a hearing on class actions
“The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003” introduced as S.274
Judiciary Committee reported favorably on S.274
“The Class Action Fairness Act of 2004” S.1751 introduced
Senate failed to invoke cloture 59-39
“The Class Action Fairness Act of 2004” S.2062 is introduced
Motion to proceed on S.2062 filed
Senate failed to invoke cloture 44-43
“The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005” introduced as S.5
Senate Judiciary Committee reports favorably on S.5
Senate passes S.5 72-26

Panel 2: U.S. House of Representatives
Date
June 27, 2001
February 26, 2001
March 6, 2001
March 7, 2001
March 12, 2002
March 13, 2002
March 6, 2003
May 15, 2003
May 21, 2003
June 12, 2003
February 2, 2005
February 17, 2005

Event

Rep. Goodlatte filed H.R. 2341
Hearings were held on H.R. 2341 by the House Committee on the Judiciary
Committee Markup
H.R. 2341 amended
House Report No. 370 issued on H.R. 2341
H.B. 2341 debated and passed
H.R. 1115 “The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003” introduced
Hearings on H.R. 1115 by House Committee on the Judiciary
The House Committee of the Judiciary holds a markup session
H.B. 1115 debated and passed
H.R. 516 “The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005” introduced
The House of Representative passes S. 5 279-149
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According to Sherman (2006), December 2003 is when CAFA’s sole focus turned
to forum shopping as other issues such as coupon settlements had already been
addressed. Therefore, we focus on the period subsequent to December 2003. If two
events occur on successive dates, (for example the introduction of the bill in the house
on February 2, 2005 and the favorable judiciary report in the senate on February 3,
2005, we choose the earlier event as the event date. From the legislative event dates
shown in Table 1 we choose February 10, 2004 (the Senate introduction of S.2062),
July 8, 2004 (failed cloture in the Senate); February 2, 2005 (H.R. 516 introduction);
February 10, 2005 (Senate passes S.5) and February 17, 2005 (the House of
Representative passes S.5). An additional Lexis-Nexis search reveals events that are
not defined as official legislative actions. These include the Presidential election on
November 2, 2004 giving the GOP a majority in the senate, Senator Frist’s decision to
remove the legislation from the agenda in June of 200413 and Senator Frist’s press
conference of January 17, 2005 outlining the senate’s legislative priorities14. The final
event dates we choose are listed in Table 2.

13

Bestwire, 06-07-2004:”Congress Honors Reagan’s Death, Delays Class Action Reform” by
Chris Grier.
14
Bestwire, 01-24-2005:”Insurer Lobby Cheers Return of Class Action Legislation” by Chris Grier.
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Table 2: Event Study Event Dates
This table shows event dates in the legislative history of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
that are examined in this paper.

Date
February 10, 2004
June 8, 2004
July 8, 2004
November 2, 2004
January 17, 2005
February 2, 2005
February 10, 2005
February 17, 2005

Event
“The Class Action Fairness Act of 2004” Introduced as
S.2062
Senator Frist Removes CAFA from the Senate Agenda
Cloture Failed 44-43
U.S. Elections Give GOP Majority in Senate
Senator Frist Press Conference Outlining CAFA as a Top
Priority
H.R. 516 “The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005”
Introduced
The U.S. Senate Passes S.5 72-26
The House of Representatives Passes S.5 279-149

Sources: Table 1 and Lexis-Nexis

5.2. Sample
Two of the CAFA’s major substantive changes are the two threshold
requirements: minimal diversity or aggregation of the amount in controversy.
Since the data regarding the aggregate amount of controversy are harder to obtain than
the diversity data, we focus on the latter to build these portfolios. The underlying
assumption here is that the minimal diversity threshold (if any defendant is a citizen of a
different state than any plaintiff, the case can be removed) would be sufficient for class
action venues to move from a state to a federal court post CAFA. Therefore, firms
involved in certain types of class actions that could have been filed in state courts in the
pre-CAFA period can no longer be sued in state courts in the post-CAFA period.
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As there are currently no datasets available that provide state level class action
data in a tractable manner, we use the Federal Court Case Integrated Database (IDB)
as proxy for the types of firms that would likely be involved in class action litigation. IDB
contains limited information regarding the amount of damages pled, but provides
delineations for case origin for every record in the dataset. For every class action we
can identify if a case was originally filed in a state or federal court.
Table 3 produces a summary of diversity class actions by nature of lawsuit in
2004 that are reported in IDB. These are instances where class action lawsuits were
initially filed in state court. Insurance and other contract actions make up 28.3% of
diversity class actions, while personal injury-product liability, motor vehicle-personal
injury, and motor vehicle-product liability account for 25.8%.
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Table 3: Diversity Class Actions in 2004.
This table presents the proportion of diversity class actions by nature of suit categories. The proportion of
diversity class actions by nature of suit categories gives an indication of the types of class actions that
CAFA may impact.

Nature of Suit (NOS)
Insurance
Negotiable Instruments
Stockholders Suits
Other Contract Actions
Foreclosure
Torts to Land
Tort Product Liability
Other Real Property Actions
Airplane Product Liability
Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Other Personal Injury
Personal Injury – Product Liability
Asbestos Personal Injury- Product Liability
Other Fraud
Truth In Lending
Other Personal Property Damage
Property Damage-Product Liability
Civil (RICO)
Constitutionality of State Statutes
Total

Percent
13.3
.8
.8
15.0
.8
3.3
.8
2.5
1.7
.8
1.7
9.2
23.3
1.7
6.7
.8
1.7
12.5
1.7
.8
100.0

Source: Federal Court Case Integrated Database

5.2.1. Product Liability Litigation Portfolio
We hypothesize that firms involved in product liability cases would exhibit a
greater price reaction to CAFA than their contract liability counterpart. Testing of this
hypothesis requires us to form two basic portfolios, namely product liability litigation
portfolio and contract litigation portfolio. Based on Table 2, we form a product liability
portfolio consisting of code 355 (Motor Vehicle Product Liability), 360 (Personal Injury),
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and 365 (Product Liability). This process yields a total of 175 diversity class actions
from 2001 through 2004.
Docket numbers are then used to extract the names of the parties in the litigation
via PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records). In most instances there are
multiple corporate defendants and in some instances there are multiple related cases.
CRSP and COMPUSTAT were then searched in order to identify firm permanent
numbers, CUSIPS, and SIC codes. Additionally, firms in the final sample must have at
least 504 trading days worth of returns from the earliest event date (02/10/2004). We
expand our sample by including firms that are in the same industries as the ones
involved in product liability litigation. The final product liability portfolio contains 304
firms with nature of suit codes 355, 360 and 365 from 2001 through 2004 as well as
peer firms extracted from COMPUSTAT by 4 digit SIC codes.
5.2.2. Contract Litigation Portfolio
For the contract liability portfolio, we employ the same screening methodology as
the product liability litigation portfolio. However, this portfolio includes class actions that
are originally filed in state courts with nature of lawsuit codes 110 (insurance) and 190
(other contracts). This process results in 97 class actions. We repeat the steps as used
in forming the product liability portfolio. The final contract liability portfolio consists of
393 firms.
5.2.3. Lobby Portfolio
In addition to the two main portfolios described above, we also include a portfolio
of firms that lobbied for CAFA. We assume that firms that advocated for the passage of
CAFA did so because they expected to benefit from its passage. The portfolio of firms
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that lobbied for the Act is selected by reviewing disclosure reports filed by lobbyists in
order to comply with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995.15 These reports contain
information regarding the firm’s client as well as the legislation lobbied for or against on
their behalf. The US Senate website contains a database of disclosure reports which is
searchable by the type and name of legislation. Search results from this database for
the years 2001 to 2005 for firms that lobbied for CAFA are presented in Table 4. The
final lobby portfolio contains 70 firms with the requisite return data.

15

http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/g_three_sections_with_teasers/lobbyingdisc.htm
Any firm that expects to receive greater than $10,000 in lobbying income must file.
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Table 4: Firms Associated With CAFA As Identified in Lobbying Disclosure
Filings
To comply with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, any firm or entity that expects to receive more than
$10,000 for their efforts must report their activity.This table lists the firms that were involved in lobbying
activities pertaining to CAFA.
3M Co.
ACA International
Ace INA Holdings
Aetna
Alticor Inc.
Altria
American Express

Ford Motor Corp.
GAF Corp.
General Electric Co.
Guidant Corp.
Hartford Financial Services Group
Health Net Inc.
Home Depot

American International Group
A.O. Smith Corp.

Household Financial Group
HSBC Group Corp.

Apple Inc.
Ashland Inc.

Humana Inc.
IMC Global

Avaya Incorporated
Bank One Corp.
Bayer Corp.
Beam Global Spirits & Wine
BNSF Railway
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
Brown-Forman Corp.
Case New Holland Inc.

ING America Ins. Holdings
Intel Corp.
Invista
ITT Corp.
Johnson & Johnson Services Inc.
Johnson Controls
JP Morgan Chase & C.
Jurix Incorporated

Caterpillar Inc.
Celanese
Cendant Corp.
Centex
Charles Schwab & Co.
Chrysler, LLC
Chubb Corp.
CNA Financial Corp.
CNA Insurance
Coca-Cola Co.
Corning Incorporated
Countrywide Financial Corp.
Cox Enterprises Inc.
Crown Cork & Seal
CSX Corporation
Cummins Inc.
CUNA Mutual Insurance Society
Deere & Co.
Dell Inc.
Dow Chemical Co.
Drummond Co.
Emerson
Farmers Group

Kimberly Clark Corp.
Koch Industries
Lasalle Bank Corp.
Liberty Mutual Group
Lorillard Tobacco Company
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.
Lyondell Chemical Company
Mass Mutual
Mass Mutual Life Insurance Co.
Maytag Corp.
MBNA Corp.
Medwestvaco Corp.
Meredith Corp.
Micron
New York Life Insurance Co.
Nissan America Inc.
Norfolk Southern Railroad
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins.
Occidental Petroleum Corp.
Owens-Illinois Inc.
Pfizer
PPG Industries Inc.
Praxair
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Prudential Financial
Radioshack Corp.
Scotts Company
Sears
Service Master Co.
Solutia Inc.
State Farm Insurance
Companies
Textron Inc.
The Bank of New York
Mellon Corp.
The Doctors Co.
Toyota Motor Company
N. Am.
Trueblue Inc.
Tyson Foods
Union Pacific Corp.
UST Public Affairs Inc.
Verizon Wireless Co.
Vulcan Materials
Wachovia Corp.
Wellpoint Health
Networks
Wells Fargo & Co.
Weyerhauser Co.
Whirlpool Corp.
Wyeth
Zurich

Table 5 presents the composition of each of the three portfolios by two-digit SIC
Major Industry Codes.
Table 5: Portfolio Composition by SIC Major Industry Group
This table presents the composition of each of the portfolios by two digit SIC Major Industry codes. The
major industry groups correspond to congressional testimony regarding industries proponents of the
legislation said were negatively impacted by pre CAFA class action litigation as well as industry groups
opponents argued would unfairly benefit from the legislation.

Panel A: Lobby Portfolio
SIC Code Industry Group
13
15
20
21
24
26
27
28
33
34
35
36
37
38
40
48
52
53
57
60
61
62
63
64
67
73
75
87

Percent

Oil and Gas Extraction
Building Construction
Food and Kindered Spirits
Cigarettes
Lumber and Wood Products
Paper and Allied Products
Printing, Publishing & Allied Industries
Chemicals and Allied Products
Primary Metal Industries
Fabricated Metal Products
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment and Components
Transportation Equipment
Measuring Analyzing and Controlling Instruments
Railroad Transportation
Communications
Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply and Mobile Home Dealers
General Merchandise Stores
Home Furniture, Furnishings and Equipment Sales
Depository Institutions
Non-Depository Credit Institutions
Security, Commodity Brokers, Dealers and Exchanges
Insurance Carriers
Insurance Agents Brokers and Service
Holding and other Investment Offices
Business Services
Automotive Repair Services and Parking
Engineering, Accounting, Research and Management Services
Total
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1.4
1.4
4.3
1.4
1.4
2.9
1.4
18.6
1.4
1.4
8.6
8.6
4.3
2.9
4.3
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
7.1
1.4
1.4
11.4
1.4
2.9
1.4
1.4
1.4
100.0

Table 5. Portfolio Composition by SIC Major Industry Group (continued)

Panel B: Product Liability Portfolio
SIC Code Industry Group
10
13
15
20
21
28
29
32
35
36
37
38
44
49
50
51
53
58
60
62
63
64
65
67
73
87

Percent

Metal Mining
Oil and Gas Extraction
Building Construction
Food & Kindered Spirits
Cigarettes
Chemicals and Allied Products
Petroleum Refining
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components
Transportation Equipment
Measuring Analyzing and Controlling Instruments
Water Transportation
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services
Wholesale Trade Durable Goods
Wholesale Trade Non-Durable Goods
General Merchandise Stores
Eating and Drinking Places
Depository Institutions
Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges
Insurance Carriers
Insurance Agents and Brokers
Real Estate
Holding and Other Investment Offices
Business Services
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management and Related Services
Total

.3
27.3
.3
.3
2.0
40.8
5.3
.3
.3
.7
3.6
7.2
.7
2.0
.7
1.0
2.6
.3
.3
.3
.3
.3
.7
1.3
.3
.7
100.0

Panel C: Contract Portfolio
SIC Code Industry Group
60
61
62
63
64
67
73
80
87

Percent

Depository Institutions
Non-Depository Institutions
Security, Commodity Brokers, Dealers and Exchanges
Insurance Carriers
Insurance Agents Brokers and Service
Holding and Other Investment Offices
Business Services
Health Services
Engineering, Accounting, Research and Management Services
Total

63.7
4.2
.2
25.0
4.4
.5
.5
.7
.5
100.0

Table 6 provides summary statistics regarding the three portfolios. The portfolio
of firms that lobbied for the legislation, in absolute terms, has significantly higher mean
levels of total assets, total debt, EBIT and revenue than both the product liability and
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contract portfolios. While the difference in average total assets and total debt are
statistically insignificant the product liability and contract portfolios have statistically
different mean levels of EBIT and Revenue. Product liability firms are substantially more
profitable (EBIT/Asset =10.6% vs. 2.1%) and have higher revenue than the contract
liability firms16.

Table 6: Selected Balance Sheet and Income Statement Means for the Three
Portfolios
The following table reports selected balance sheet and income statement means for the three portfolios
as well as their sample sizes.

Portfolio

Lobby

Product

Contract

Liability
# of Firms

70

304

393

Total Assets (MM$) 103,353 13,343

19,769

Total Debt (MM$)

25,062

3,797

4,501

EBIT (MM$)

4,198

1,413

419

Revenue (MM$)

24,067

11,079

2,595

16

We conduct significance tests for the differences in means assuming unequal sample variances.
Tabular results are not reported.
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5.3. METHODOLOGY
5.3.1. Event Study Model
The standard market model in event studies uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
method to regress estimates the market model and regresses individual stock returns
on the return of a market portfolio. Abnormal returns in the event window are calculated
as the estimated disturbance term of the market model calculated out of sample and
residuals are assumed to be independently and identically distributed. Since we are
estimating abnormal returns for our sample firms on the same event date (CAFA), the
potential for cross sectional heteroskedasticity as well as for dependence among
residuals exist. As such, we employ Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR) method. SUR yields identical coefficients and standard errors as OLS but has
the capability of testing, via Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM), for joint hypothesis
in the presence of cross sectional heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous
dependence among residuals.17
Following Binder (1985a) the methodology begins by estimating abnormal returns

γ ia

in

the individual return equations :
~

~

A

~

Rit = α i + βi R mt + ∑ γ ia Dat + ε it

(1)

a =1

where Rit is the return on security i on day t , Rmt is the return on the CRSP value
(equal) weighted market index on day t, Dat is a dummy variable equaling 1 during the
ath event window and 0 otherwise; γ , β , and α are the parameters to be estimated.
17

MVRM, also known as event parameter approach uses joint Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method.
This approach is employed by many researchers including Schipper and Thompson (1983), Binder (1985
a and b, and 1988), Rose (1985), Smith Bradley and Jarrell (1986), Cornett and Tehranian (1990), and
Brown, Cummins, Lewis and Wei (2004).
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When the explanatory variables are the same across equations the system of returns,
equations can be written as below and estimated jointly by the MVRM:
~

~

A

~

R Nt = α N + β N R mt + ∑ γ Na Dat + ε Nt

(2)

a =1

MVRM approach allows for contemporaneous correlation across equations, however
the disturbance terms ε it are assumed to be i.i.d. In this specification, cumulative
abnormal returns are summed over event windows and hypothesis testing focuses on
the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) defined as:

1 N
γ = ∑ γ i,a
N i =1

(3)

In a portfolio framework equation (2) can be written in the following form
~

A

~

~

R Pt = α P + β P R mt + ∑ γ Pa Dat + ε Pt

(4)

a =1

^

where the estimated γ Pa in equation (4) is equivalent to γ in equation 3.
We test each event separately setting a equal to one, the impact of individual events on
the different portfolios is estimated by the following
~

~

R Pt = α P + β P R mt + γ p Dt + ε pt

(5)

In testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, we use the following equation to estimate the
average abnormal return:
^

γP =0

(6)

5.3.2. Cross-sectional Regression Model
To explain cross-sectional variations in CARs across firms (i.e., to test
Hypothesis 3), we employ OLS model in which we regress CARs of each firm on a
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number of independent variables that serve as proxies for firm-specific characteristics,
including its internal corporate governance mechanism in place. The independent
variables we include here are board size, the number of analysts that follow the firm, an
indicator variable if the CEO is the chairman of the board, the firm’s Altman z-score,
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) scaled by total assets, total debt scaled by
total assets, the log of total assets and dummy variables representing the two digit sic
codes for the pharmaceutical, oil and gas and medical devices industries. Explanations
for using these independent variables will be provided later in this paper.

5.4. Data Sources
The Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research or ICSPR18 is
a repository for various social and political data. We access court case related data
through the Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base (IDB)19. Data from the years
2001 to 2006 are published individually, while pre-2001 data is published in an
aggregate form from 1970 to 2000. These databases compile federal PACER20 (Public
Access to Court Electronic Records) data in SAS and SPSS readable data files. Files
contain data items such as docket number, district, file date, termination date, the
nature of the suit, the disposition of the suit, nature of judgment, termination date and a
flag as to whether or not the case was filed as a class action.
ICSPR is the primary source for identifying firms for portfolios compiled by their
nature of suit. Plaintiff and defendant names are not included from the Federal IDB
through ICSPR. After screening by nature of suit categories we then return to PACER
18

www.icpsr.umich.edu
Federal Judicial Center. FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 2004
20
www.pacer.uscourts.gov
19
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and retrieve corporate defendant data by docket number. Daily stock returns are
obtained through CRSP while balance sheet and income statement data are taken from
COMPUSTAT21. Risk Metrics and firm proxy statements serve as sources for board
size, CEO and chairman data. I/B/E/S is our source for analyst coverage.
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
6.1 Event Study
The results of the event study are reported in Tables 7, 8 and 9. We have
provided estimates using both the equal weighted and value weighted CRSP market
index. The analysis uses three different estimation periods consisting of estimation
lengths of (252,-4), (252,126) and (126,-42)22. The results are reported separately for
each estimation period in Table 7 (Model 1), Table 8 (Model 2), and Table 9 (Model 3)
respectively. We find some evidence that the firms that lobbied for the legislation
experienced abnormally positive returns on February 10, 2005 and November 2, 2004.
These dates correspond to the passage of CAFA by the US Senate and the election
date that yielded the Republicans a majority in the US Senate. Average abnormal
returns for February 10, 2005 range from 1.1% to 1.26% over the three models.
Results are significant at the 5% level. Model 3 yields a significantly positive average
abnormal returns of .64% over the (-1,1) election period. No other event dates for the
lobby portfolio have significant cumulative average abnormal returns.

21

Access is provided through WRDS, wrds.wharton.upenn.edu.
Benchmark daily returns are estimated over the trading year ending 4 days prior to the event, six
months after the event and the six month period ending 42 days before the event respectively. These
estimation periods correspond to previous event studies. For example Schipper (1985) uses a period of
six months before to six months after the event and Haslem (2005) uses the (126,-42) estimation period.
22
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Table 7: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns from model 1:
~

~

R Pt = α P + β P R mt + γ p Dt + ε pt
^

H 0: γ P = 0
Where p=1,2,3 representing portfolios of firms that lobbied for CAFA, a portfolio of firms in industries in
which cohort firms had state originated product liability class actions pending as of 2004, and a portfolio
of firms in which cohort firms had state originated contract class actions pending as of 2004. The Model is
estimated using SUR. The market portfolio is estimated for a period of 252 days ending 4 days before the
event. Returns are cumulated over the event window (-1,1). Event parameters correspond to the following
event dates: 2/17/05 (1), 2/10/05 (2), 2/2/05 (3), 1/17/05 (4), 11/2/04 (5), 7/08/04 (6), 6/08/04 (7) and
2/10/04 (8). Prob>F are reported below parameter estimates.

Expected
Sign

Event
Window
(-1,1)
Event
Parameter

+

γ1

Equal
Weight
.0003
(.7941)

Value
Weight
.0017
(.5906)

Product Liability
Class Action
Portfolio
Equal
Value
Weight Weight
.0147** .0154**
(.0182) (.0484)

+

γ2

.011**
(.049)

.0044
(.1682)

.0039
(.5263)

-.0031
(.6882)

.0024
(.6066)

-.0026
(.5621)

+

γ3

-.0046
(.4141)

-.0046
(.1490)

.0083
(.1803)

.0094
(.2329)

-.0028
(.5365)

-.0025
(.5824)

+

γ4

.-0040
(.4920)

.-0031
(.3393)

.0037
(.5587)

.0056
(.4973)

.0000
(.9925)

.0009
(.8417)

+

γ5

.0069
(.2421)

.0047
(.1566)

-.0058
(.3423)

-.0064
(.4321)

.0015
(.7505)

.0016
(.7319)

-

γ6

.0053
(.4376)

-.0007
(.8413)

0015
(.8093)

-.0088
(.2933)

.0039
(.4519)

-.0028
(.6017)

-

γ7

.0077
(.2749)

.0010
(.7770)

-.0112*
(.0758)

-.0178**
(.0378)

.0003
(.5618)

-.0036
(.4926)

+

γ8

-.0018
(.8449)
70

.0001
(.9746)
70

.0046
(.4747)
304

-.0083
(.3391)
304

-.0013
(.7951)
393

.0011
(.8472)
393

N

Lobby Firm
Portfolio

***,** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Contract Class Action
Portfolio
Equal
Weight
-.0065
(.1579)

Value
Weight
-.0057
(.2046)

Table 8: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns from model 2:
~

~

R Pt = α P + β P R mt + γ p Dt + ε pt
^

H 0: γ P = 0
Where p=1,2,3 representing portfolios of firms that lobbied for CAFA, a portfolio of firms in industries in
which cohort firms had state originated product liability class actions pending as of 2004, and a portfolio
of firms in which cohort firms had state originated contract class actions pending as of 2004. The Model is
estimated using SUR. The market portfolio is estimated for a period of 252 days ending 126 days after
the event. Returns are cumulated over the event window (-1,1). Event parameters correspond to the
following event dates: 2/17/05 (1), 2/10/05 (2), 2/2/05 (3), 1/17/05 (4), 11/2/04 (5), 7/08/04 (6), 6/08/04 (7)
and 2/10/04 (8). Prob>F are reported below parameter estimates.

Expected
Sign

Event
Window
(-1,1)
Event
Parameter

+

Lobby Firm
Portfolio

γ1

Equal
Weight
.0015
(.7941)

Value
Weight
.0029
(.4619)

Product Liability
Class Action
Portfolio
Equal
Value
Weight Weight
.0149**
.0157*
(.0444) (.0719)

+

γ2

.0126**
(.0294)

.0063
(.1060)

.0052
(.4809)

+

γ3

-.0035
(.7115)

-.0024
(.5369)

+

γ4

-.0021
(.7202)

+

γ5

-

Contract Class Action
Portfolio
Equal
Weight
-.0062
(.2494)

Value
Weight
-.0053
(.2937)

-.0021
(.8092)

.0027
(.6170)

-.0022
(.6604)

.0072
(.3248)

.0094
(.2735)

-.0003
(.5836)

-.0019
(.7144)

-.0005
(.8943)

.0011
(.8736)

.0040
(.6392)

.0003
(.9952)

.0019
(.7145)

.0076
(.1821)

.0064*
(.0897)

-.0067
(.3492)

-.0065
(.4206)

.0021
(.6488)

.0019
(.6933)

γ6

.0069
(.4376)

.0001
(.8413)

.0021
(.7764)

-.0074
(.3631)

.0007
(.1313)

-.0003
(.9464)

-

γ7

.0071
(.2265)

.0023
(.5223)

-.0131*
(.0696)

-.0176**
(.0323)

.0029
(.5358)

-.0012
(.7988)

+

γ8

-.0001
(.9831)
70

-.0033
(.5655)
70

.0066
(.4037)
304

.0025
(.8359)
304

-.0042
(.3568)
393

-.0009
(.8363)
393

N

***,** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 9: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns from model 3:
~

~

R Pt = α P + β P R mt + γ p Dt + ε pt
^

H 0: γ P = 0
Where p=1,2,3 representing portfolios of firms that lobbied for CAFA, a portfolio of firms in industries in
which cohort firms had state originated product liability class actions pending as of 2004, and a portfolio
of firms in which cohort firms had state originated contract class actions pending as of 2004. The Model is
estimated using SUR. The market portfolio is estimated for a period of 126 days ending 42 days before
the event. Returns are cumulated over the event window (-1,1). Event parameters correspond to the
following event dates: 2/17/05 (1), 2/10/05 (2), 2/2/05 (3), 1/17/05 (4), 11/2/04 (5), 7/08/04 (6), 6/08/04 (7)
and 2/10/04 (8). Prob>F are reported below parameter estimates.

Expected
Sign

Event
Window
(-1,1)
Event
Parameter

+

γ1

Equal
Weight
.0013
(.7941)

Value
Weight
.0017
(.6394)

Product Liability
Class Action
Portfolio
Equal
Value
Weight
Weight
.0153**
.0210*
(.0431)
(.0748)

+

γ2

.0116**
(.0461)

.0042
(.2410)

.0037
(.6201)

-.0039
(.6737)

.0018
(.6983)

-.0036
(.4333)

+

γ3

-.0005
(.3887)

-.0048
(.1753)

.0076
(.3193)

.0088
(.3477)

-.0035
(.4221)

-.0031
(.4866)

+

γ4

-.0034
(.3286)

-.0047
(.4146)

.0040
(.5402)

.0059
(.4501)

-.0003
(.9438)

.0009
(.8386)

+

γ5

.0048
(.3950)

.0004
(.2114)

-.0039
(.6220)

-.0028
(.7682)

.0026
(.5507)

.0026
(.5597)

-

γ6

.0043
(.4949)

-.0003
(.9286)

.0031
(.6398)

-.0125
(.1926)

.0023
(.6614)

-.0026
(.6160)

-

γ7

.0077
(.1981)

.0013
(.7031)

-.0087
(.1918)

-.0162*
(.0834)

.0011
(.8213)

-.0035
(.4904)

+

γ8

.0006
(.9399)
70

.0005
(.9056)
70

.0106
(.1184)
304

.0132
(.1324)
304

-.0031
(.5591)
393

-.0017
(.7631)
393

N

Lobby Firm
Portfolio

Contract Class
Action Portfolio
Equal
Weight
-.0068
(.1512)

Value
Weight
-.0069
(.1401)

***,** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

The product liability portfolio shows evidence of positive average abnormal
returns for all three models, ranging from 1.47% to 2.1%, at the news of the passing of
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CAFA by the House of Representatives (February 17, 2005). They are significant at the
5% and 10% levels. Additionally, there are significant negative abnormal returns when
Senator Frist delays consideration of the legislation on June 7, 2004. It was reported
that there was not enough support in the senate and the legislation failed cloture on July
8, 2004. Significantly negative parameter estimates range from -1.12% to -1.78%.
Figure 2. Daily Average Abnormal Returns

Panel A. The Contract Liability Portfolio

38

Figure 2. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (continued)

Panel B. The Product Liability Portfolio

There are no significant abnormal returns for the Contract Class Action portfolio
over any of the event dates. In figure 2 panel A and B we report the average abnormal
daily returns for the two weeks prior to the February 17, 2005 event date through the
day after (the signing of the act) for the contract and product liability portfolios. We see a
spike in daily average abnormal returns on day -1 and day +1 for all models and both
portfolios.23

23

In figure 2 we illustrate average daily abnormal returns for the CRSP using the CRSP value weighted
index. We see a similar pattern in the equal weighted results as well.
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We sum up our findings based on Tables 8, 9, and 10 as follows:
1.We find weak evidence that shareholders of firms that lobbied for the passage
of CAFA experience significant average abnormal returns when the House of
Representatives pass the law and over the election event window;
2.We find strong evidence that shareholders of firms in the product liability
portfolio experience wealth increases as of the February 17, 2005 (passing of
CAFA by the House of Representatives) and wealth losses over the June 8,
2004 (Senator Frist delays consideration of the legislation)24.
3.We find no evidence that shareholders of firms in the contract portfolio
experience any changes in wealth as a result of the passage of CAFA.
In hypothesis 1, we propose that the direction of CAFA effect is an empirical
issue. The results indicate that the market perceives CAFA to be positive news for the
affected firms. In other words, positive aspects of CAFA (e.g., the possibility of a
reduced number of frivolous class-action law suits and potential for reduced amount of
punitive award) outweigh what opponents describe as negative aspects of CAFA. The
results are also consistent with hypothesis 2 in that the companies that are more likely
to be involved in product liability lawsuits are more sensitive to CAFA than those that
are primarily involved in contract liability lawsuits.

24

As a robustness check we tested joint hypotheses using SUR across the product liability and contract
portfolios on February 17, 2005 and June 8, 2004 . The results support our conclusion regarding the
significant differences between these two portfolios.
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6.2. Cross Sectional Determinants of Abnormal Returns
In this section, we test Hypothesis 3 to examine if firm characteristics (including
internal corporate governance) are able to explain the variations in CARs across firms.
We employ OLS by regressing individual firm’s CAR on independent variables
representing firm characteristics.
Our empirical findings thus far indicate that product liability prone firms
experience significant cumulative average abnormal returns over the February 17, 2005
event date. Cross sectional analysis is performed in order to identify firm specific
characteristics of the product liability firms that explain the cross sectional variation in
cumulative abnormal returns over the February 17, 2005 event date. In the crosssectional regression, we use the firm level CARs over the event window (-1,1).
6.2.1. The Model
We derive a model based on the discussion in the 4.2 sub-section above. The
model also includes variables that have been found significant by other researchers
(see Bhagat, Bizjak and Coles,1998, for example) in explaining abnormal returns
around the litigation events. Our analysis focuses on the agency conflicts that arise as a
result of the manager-owner relationship.

The model is presented below.

CARi = α + β1 BOARDSIZE + β 2 ANALYST + β 3CEOCHAIRMAN +
β 4 ZSCORE + β 5 EBIT / TA + β 6 D / TA + β 7 LOGTA + β 8 SIC13 + β 9 SIC28
+ β10 SIC38 + ε i

(7)

Provided below are the definitions of each variable and justification for the choice
of each independent variable along with the expected sign.
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CAR is the firm’s CAR for the event window (-1,1), with event date being
February 17, 2005 (passing of CAFA by the House of Representatives).
BOARDSIZE is the firm’s board size. Research provides evidence that
companies with small boards are associated with more favorable financial ratios
and also provide stronger CEO performance incentives (for example, Rosenstein
and Wyatt, 1990,1997, Yermack, 1996, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998,
Shivdasani and Yermack,1999, and Denis and McConnell, 2003).We expect a
negative coefficient on BOARDSIZE.
ANALYST is the number of analysts following a firm. The number of analysts
following a firm has been positively associated with firm value and less earnings
management. For example, Chung and Jo (1996) find a positive relationship
between the number of analysts following a firm and firm value. Hong, Lim and
Stein (2000) find that momentum strategies perform well in firms with low analyst
coverage. Yu (2008) finds that firms followed by more analysts manage their
earnings less. We expect the coefficient on ANALYST to be positive.
CEOCHAIRMAN is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 when CEO is
also the chairman of the board. There is empirical evidence showing both
positive and negative relationships when the CEO is the chairman of the board.
Baliga and Moyer (1996) test CEO duality against perception that concentration
of CEO and Chairman of the Board functions negatively impact firm performance.
However, they find no evidence of significant reactions to announcements of
changes in duality and find no evidence of changes in operating performance
around the announcement and weak evidence of positive long term performance.
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Rechner and Dalton (1991) find that firms that separate the CEO and Chairman
positions outperform firms that do not. Haslem (2005) reports a negative
coefficient when the same person occupies the role of both CEO and Chairman.
Following Haslem, we expect a negative coefficient on CEOCHAIRMAN.
ZSCORE is the firm’s Altman z-score. It measures a firm’s proximity to
bankruptcy. The expected sign is positive based on the logic that CAFA might
reduce the exposure of an already financially troubled firm to further trouble
stemming from class-action lawsuits in state courts. Previous studies such as
Bhagat, Bizjak and Coles (1998) and Haslem (2005) include this variable.
EBIT/TA is a firm’s EBIT scaled by its total assets. We include EBIT/TA as a
proxy for firm profitability and a test of the deep pockets hypothesis. Our logic
here is that profitable firms will benefit if the market perceives they are less likely
to suffer a large judgment or settlement. This measure is most often used in
bankruptcy prediction models as an independent variable testing financial
stability (for example, Pinches, Mingo and Caruthers, 1973; and Jung, Kim and
Stultz,1996).
D/TA is the firm’s debt ratio (total debt/total assets). This variable serves as a
proxy for a manager’s disincentive to overinvest. Jensen (1986) shows managers
have an incentive to invest regardless of the present value of their investment
when they accrue private benefits. A solution to this overinvestment problem is
by increasing debt to force management to disgorge free cash flows. Stulz (1990)
shows that debt levels are optimally tied to the positive net present value
investment set. Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) find an inverse relationship
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between leverage and managerial entrenchment. Thus, we expect a positive
coefficient on this variable.
LOGTA is the log of total assets. Bhagat, Bizjak and Coles (1998) and Haslem
(2005) use this variable as a measure of transparency—the bigger the size, the
less the transparency. We expect the sign to be negative on this variable.
SIC 13, 28, 38 are 2-digit sic codes representing pharmaceutical, oil and gas,
and medical devices industries respectively. We include dummy variables for
each of the three major industry groups in the product liability portfolio. (Groups
13, 28 and 38 comprise respectively 27.3%, 40.8% and 7.2% of the product
liability portfolio.) The congressional record specifically mentions pharmaceutical,
oil and gas and medical device manufacturers in the context of firms that have
nationwide class actions heard in state courts25. We expect positive coefficients
on these industry dummy variables reflecting a positive market reaction for these
firms if they benefit as legislators predicted.
6.2.2. Data
We collect balance sheet and income statement information from COMPUSTAT
annual files in 2004. Security return data is extracted from CRSP. Risk Metrics26 and
firm proxy statements serve as sources for board size, CEO and chairman data. I/B/E/S
is our source for analyst coverage. There were 304 firms in our product liability portfolio
for the initial event study. Our final sample consists of 161 firms for which we have
complete return and cross sectional data. Additionally, we perform the analysis on a

25

th

Senate Report 109-14 109 Congress February 28, 2005, p. 65.
The Risk Metrics governance set was formerly known as the IRRC Takeover Defense database cited in
Gompers, Metrick and Ishii (2003). It provides various director data related to individual board members
of S&P 1500 companies.

26
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sample of 213 firms for which we have all return and cross sectional data excluding the
chairman indicator variable and board size. We report the mean values for our cross
sectional variables in Table 10.
Table 10. Cross Sectional Independent Variable Means

Mean Independent Variables
ANALYST
11.273
BOARDSIZE
8.925
ZSCORE
6.541
D/TA
0.206
EBIT/TA
0.060
LOG TA
6.988

6.2.3. Results of Cross-sectional Regression
Table 11 presents results for the sample of 161 firms for which we have all cross
sectional data. In terms of internal corporate governance variables, the results show
that CEOCHAIRMAN has a negative impact (significant at the 1% level), D/TA and
ANALYST have a positive impact (significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively), and
BOARDSIZE has no significant on a firm’s abnormal return in response to CAFA.
Among other variables, ZSCORE and EBIT/TA have significantly positive affect on a
firm’s CAR (at the 1% level) while LOGTA has no significant impact on the same. Twodigit SIC codes do not have any explanatory power.
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Table 11. Cross Sectional Determinants of CARs
This table presents an analysis of the effect of various factors in explaining cross-sectional variations in
abnormal returns of firms in the product liability portfolio. The event date is February 17, 2005 when the
House of Representatives passed the final version of CAFA. The regression model used is:

CARi = α + β1BOARDSIZE + β 2 CEOCHAIRMAN + β 3 ANALYST +
β 4 ZSCORE + β 5 EBIT / TA + β 6 D / TA + β 7 LOGTA + β 8 SIC13 + β 9 SIC28
+ β10 SIC 38 + ε i
The model is estimated using OLS. BOARDSIZE is the number of members of the board of directors,
CEOCHAIRMAN is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board,
ANALYST is the number of analysts following the firm, ZSCORE is the Altman z-score of the firm,
EBIT/TA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization scaled by the firm’s total
assets, LOGTA is the log of firm total assets and SIC13, SIC28 and SIC38 are industry dummy variables.

Predicted Sign

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

Parameter Estimate
(P-value)
α
.0094
(.6284)
β1
.0013
(.4951)
β2
-.0238***
(.0077)
β3
.0016**
(.0202)
β4
.0009***
(.0049)
β5
.0797***
(.0000)
β6
.0879***
(.0003)
β7
-.0040
(.2792)
β8
-.0157
(.1231)
β9
-.0076
(.7012)
β10
-.0196
(.1074)

N
R sq.

Variable
Intercept
Boardsize
Chairman
Analyst
Z Score
EBIT/TA
D/TA
LOG TA
SIC 13
SIC 28
SIC 38
161
.29

***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 11 provides evidence that internal corporate governance as well as certain
firm characteristics explain cross-sectional variations in abnormal return among firms
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within the product liability portfolio. Shareholders of firms that do not split the role of
CEO and chairman of the board suffer losses stemming from a weaker internal
corporate governance system. This is consistent with the view that separating these
roles reduces agency conflicts and enhances firm value. Firms with higher debt levels
(as measured by D/TA) had higher cumulative abnormal returns. This is supportive of
the views that higher debt levels reduce agency costs either through increased
monitoring of management or by reducing their incentives to pursue perquisites. The
positive and significant coefficient on the ANALYST variable indicates that firms with
less information asymmetry have higher CARs, other things held equal.
Shareholders of more profitable firms (as measured by EBIT/TA) and firms that
are further away from bankruptcy (as measured by ZSCORE) experience higher CARs.
This is consistent with the viewpoint that firms with more to lose by class action litigation
are more likely to gain from the passage of CAFA as firms in closer proximity to
bankruptcy may be one class action verdict away from bankruptcy.
Table 12 presents results for an extended sample of 213 firms which have the
data for all variables except BOARDSIZE and CEOCHAIRMAN. We find similar results
as in Table 11. However, in this specification we do find SIC38 is significantly positive27.
SIC38 comprises 7.2% of the product liability portfolio and includes firms in the medical
device industry. The congressional record specifically mentions medical device
manufacturers in the context of firms that have nationwide class actions heard in state
courts. Thus far our results indicate shareholder wealth gains for firms likely to be
involved in product liability class actions as a result of CAFA. One interpretation of these
27

We ran a specification in which all firms with SIC codes 13, 28 and 38 were coded as dummy variables. The
results were not qualitatively different than our initial specification.

47

results is that the market perceives state courts as a less favorable forum for corporate
defendants. The final section of our paper examines this issue directly.
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Table 12. Cross Sectional Determinants of CARs
This table presents an analysis of the effect of various factors in explaining cross-sectional variations in
abnormal returns of firms in the product liability portfolio. The event date is February 17, 2005 when the
House of Representatives passed the final version of CAFA. The regression model used is:

CARi = α + β1 ANALYST + β 2 ZSCORE + β 3 EBIT / TA + β 4 D / TA + β 5 LOGTA + β 6 SIC13 + β 7 SIC28
+ β 8 SIC 38 + ε i
The model is estimated using OLS. ANALYST is the number of analysts following the firm, ZSCORE is
the altman z-score of the firm, EBIT/TA is earnings before interest and taxes scaled by the firm’s total
assets, LOGTA is the log of firm total assets and SIC13, SIC28 and SIC38 are industry dummy variables.

Predicted
Sign

Parameter

α

+

β1

+

β2

+

β3

+

β4

+

β5

+

β6

+

β7

+

β8

Estimate
(P-value)
.0000
(.992)
.0008*
(.0895)
.0009***
(.0054)
.0728***
(.0000)
.0681***
(.0017)
-.0024
(.2743)
-.0100
(.3530)
-.0073
(.4086)
.0328*
(.0580)

N
R sq.

Variable
Intercept
Analyst
Z Score
EBIT/TA
D/TA
LOG TA
SIC 13
SIC 28
SIC 38
213
.192

***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
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6.3 MARKET REACTION TO FORUM CHANGE
CAFA has significantly limited state jurisdiction over class-action lawsuits. The
results reported above demonstrate that the market reaction to the events favoring
CAFA’s passage has been positive. On the other hand, the market reaction is usually
negative to events that are perceived by shareholders as to reduce the chances of
CAFA passage. A conclusion that one can derive from previously reported results is that
state courts are perceived by shareholders to be unfavorable forums for corporate
defendants.
There have been a few empirical studies on this issue and their results have
been inconclusive. Also, none of these studies examines the forum issue in the context
of class-action litigations. Helland and Taborrak (2002) perform an exhaustive analysis
using 75,000 tort awards from various states. They control for differences in injuries,
poverty levels, income, selection effects and many others. Focusing on diversity cases
and states that they define as partisan when the judiciary is elected and non-partisan
where it is not, they find that state court judges award significantly higher awards than
their federal counterparts when applying the same state laws. They conclude that
changing venues from a non-partisan state court to a partisan state court increases
expected awards by 23% whereas moving from a non-partisan state to a partisan state
when a federal judge applies state law does not increase expected awards.
The evidence reported by Willging and Wheatman (2006) and Cohen (2006),
however, contradict that of Helland and Taborrak (2002). In a study that included
comparing attorney perceptions of class action certification by forum to class-action trial
outcomes, Willging and Wheatman (2006) find that state and federal courts were
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equally likely to certify class actions in the pre CAFA period. Cohen (2006) compares
civil litigation in federal and state courts in some of the most populous counties in the
United States. After comparing diversity issues relating to tort, contract and real
property issues Cohen (2006) reports that the overall plaintiffs’ win rates are similar in
state and federal courts. Also, damage awards are larger in federal courts, especially in
product liability cases.
In this section, we examine the market reaction to events of class action cases being
remanded to state courts in spite of defendant firms’ efforts to have them tried in a
federal court. If the market reaction to this news is indeed negative, this result will be
consistent with our earlier finding that extended power of federal courts has been
received by stockholders of defendant firms as a favorable outcome of CAFA. To the
best of our knowledge, this section represents the first attempt to examine CARs related
to forum change involving class action litigation.

6.3.1 Event Definition, Sample Selection and Methodology
6.3.1.1. Event Definition
In class action litigations, the ultimate forum of adjudication is not necessarily the
jurisdiction in which the case is originally filed. While plaintiffs initially choose the filing
venue, procedural rules allow the defendants to challenge jurisdiction. This is
accomplished by filing a motion to remove an action. When removing a class action
lawsuit from state to federal courts, the federal court ultimately determines the
appropriate jurisdiction. If the federal court refuses jurisdiction, the case is remanded to
state court. The event of interest here is the date a class action is remanded to state
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court. To be consistent with the results reported above, we should find a negative
market reaction to the remanding event.

6.3.1.2. Sample
Using the Federal Integrated Database we initially screen for state originated
class action lawsuits in the pre-CAFA period from 2001 to 200428. We then identify
cases that were remanded to state court and the date of remand. In each instance, the
matter was originally filed as a state court class action and the defendants moved for a
removal to federal jurisdiction, but the federal court remanded the case to the
jurisdiction of original filing. This yields 122 class action lawsuits that fall within the
product liability and contract liability categories29. Once these cases are identified,
docket numbers are used in coordination with PACER (Public Access to Court
Electronic Records) in order to review the specific docket histories of these cases. A
case is included if it is remanded without any additional significant information in its
docket history at the time of remand. Our goal is to identify events where the only
significant information is that the case will be tried in state court. Additional information
may or may not influence the direction of stock market responses. For example, there
are instances in which a case is remanded, but a defendant is dismissed. This may be
positive for the remaining corporate defendants if it signals an avenue out of the
litigation or negative if the remaining defendants will assume more of the liability.
Another example of positive information associated with remand is when the litigants

28

During this time period the data files for the Federal IDB are continuous and the Class Action Fairness
Act had not yet been passed. These cases are classified as diversity cases in the database as the
29
These are 355 (Motor Vehicle), 360(Personal Injury), 365 (Product Liability), 110 (Insurance) and 90
(Other Contract).
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make stipulations that might resolve some of the uncertainty around the litigation.30
Table 13 provides an excerpt from docket history showing the remand order pertaining
to class-action suit against Phillip Morris. Our final sample contains 57 firm event dates.
Table 13. Docket History Excerpt
The following excerpt is from Aspinall v. Phillip Morris Companies. The history reflects
the date of the notice of removal, the date stipulations are made regarding damages
and the Order of Remand.
Date Filed

Entry #

05/03/2002

1

12/17/2002

38

12/17/2002

39

Docket Text
Notice of Removal. Filed by Philip Morris Companies, Inc.,
Philip Morris Incorporated. Filing fee paid; receipt number
633751. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Volume 1 of 2# 2
Appendix Volume 2 of 2# 3 Civil Cover Sheet)(W, Jo)
(Entered: 05/06/2002)
Memorandum Opinion Granting Motion to remand case
(Related Doc # 9 ); this action is remanded with the
following findings, which shall be binding as the law of the
case, (1)plaintiffs will not seek compensatory or punitive
damages, including injuncitive relief, in excess of $75,000
per plaintiff, and any award of damages will be so limited;
and (2) plaintiffs will not seek, and will not be permitted to
seek, damages or relief for personal injury claims. Donald
C. Nugent, Judge (C, B) (Entered: 12/19/2002
Order of Remand by Judge Donald C. Nugent that
pursuant to the memorandum opinion 38 plaintiffs' motion
to remand 9 is granted and this action is remanded to the
Court of Common Pleas for Medina County, Ohio, with the
following stipulations: (1) plaintiffs will not seek
compensatory or punitive damages, including injunctive
relief in excess of $75,000.00 per plaintiff, and any award
of damages will be so limited; and (2) plaintiffs will not
seek, and will not be permitted to seek, damages or relief
for personal injury or addiction claims; the Clerk is
directed to mail a certified copy of this Order of Remand
to the Clerk of the Medina County, Ohio, Court of
Common Pleas. (C, B) (Entered: 12/19/2002)
Source: PACER Docket History

30

An example of the former is the dismissal of a pharmaceutical company as a defendant upon remand
and an example of the latter is an agreement by plaintiffs not to seek damages in excess of $75,000 per
claimant in tobacco litigation.
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6.3.1.3. Methodology
We conduct event studies using three conventional models over two event
windows. The first method is the standard market model estimated using equally
weighted and value weighted indices31. Estimates are carried out over the event
windows (-1,1) and (3,3). Following Haslem (2005) we use an estimation period
beginning 168 days prior to the event date continuing for 126 days and ending 42 days
prior to the event. We also use an estimation period lasting for 252 days ending four
days prior to the event date32. Secondly, we employ the Fama-French (1993) three
factor model augmented with Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. We also present
results for market adjusted returns. Market adjusted returns are calculated by
subtracting the market return on day t from the observed firm return on day t.
6.3.2. Results
The results of the event studies are reported in Table 14 and Table 15 for the
(-1,1) and (-3,3) event windows respectively. CARs of both the market model and
market adjusted model range from -.27% to -.85% and are significantly negative (at the
10% and 5% level respectively). However, results of the augmented Fama-French
model are not statistically significant. At least the market model and market adjusted
model provide evidence that stockholders of defendant firms react negatively when a
class-action lawsuit is reverted back to the state court.

31

These are the CRSP value and equally weighted indices.
This is the same estimation period used in our earlier analysis.

32
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Table 14. Event Period Returns Around Forum Change
The following table reports mean cumulative average returns for 3 benchmark models and 2 estimation
periods around a (-1,1) event window for termination dates in which a class action case was remanded to
state from federal court. Panel A reports the results using the market model as a benchmark, panel B
reports results based upon the Fama-French model augmented with Carhart’s momentum factor and
panel C reports results for Market Adjusted Returns. The two estimation periods include 252 days ending
4 days prior to the event and 168 days ending 42 days prior to the event (as in Haslem 2005). The
sample contains 57 events for firms with useable CRSP returns from 2001-2004. All firms in the sample
had suits originally filed in state courts, defendants had them removed to federal court and the event
corresponds to the date these cases were remanded back to state court.

Estimation Period

252 days, -4

126 days, -42

Event Window
(-1,1)
(-1,1)
Panel A: Market Model
Equal Weighted
-.34%
-.30%
-1.805**
-1.758**
Value Weighted
-.33%
-.27%
-1.590**
-1.550*
Panel B: Fama-French-Momentum
Equal Weighted
-.17%
-.20%
-1.046
-1.100
Value Weighted
-.02%
-.12%
-1.082
-.574
Panel C: Market Adjusted Returns
Equal Weighted
-.85%
-.85%
-2.160**
-2.118**
Value Weighted
-.41%
-.41%
-2.123**
-2.077**
The symbols ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.

Table 15 reports the results when extending the event window to (-3,3A longer
event window is prone to show results that are likely to be biased against finding
significant CARs due to information leakage and the problem of identifying the exact
event date. In spite of this potential bias, our results are even stronger than Table 14 in
that now all three models (the augmented Fama-French model, market model and
market-adjusted model) show negative CARs that are significant at a 5% significance
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level or better. Overall, the results in Tables 14 and 15 provide clear evidence that
stockholders of a defendant firm react negatively to the ruling that remands a classaction lawsuit from a federal to a state court. These results are consistent with abovereported findings that shareholders react positively to CAFA-induced extended federal
jurisdiction on class-action suits.
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Table 15. Event Period Returns Around Forum Change
The following table reports mean cumulative average returns for 3 benchmark models and 2 estimation
periods around a (-3,3) event window for termination dates in which a class action case was remanded to
state court from federal court. Panel A reports the results using the market model as a benchmark, panel
B reports results based upon the Fama-French model augmented with Carhart’s momentum factor and
panel C reports results for Market Adjusted Returns. The two estimation periods include 252 days ending
4 days prior to the event and 168 days ending 42 days prior to the event (as in Haslem 2005). The
sample contains n events for firms with useable CRSP returns from 2001-2004. All firms in the sample
had suits originally filed in state courts, defendants had them removed to federal court and the event
corresponds to the date these cases were remanded back to state court.

Estimation Period

252 days, -4

126 days, -42

Event Window

(-3,3)
(-3,3)
Panel A: Market Model
Equal Weighted
-1.51%
-1.45%
-2.600***
3.084****
Value Weighted
-1.39%
-1.25%
-2.649***
-2.345***
Panel B: Fama-French-Momentum
Equal Weighted
-.79%
-.72%
-2.371***
-2.424***
Value Weighted
-.89%
-.71%
-1.877**
-2.693***
Panel C: Market Adjusted Returns
Equal Weighted
-2.27%
-2.27%
-2.690***
-2.649***
Value Weighted
-1.34%
-1.34%
-1.858**
-1.812**

The symbols ****,***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the .1%, 1%, 5% and and 10% levels.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
Passage of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 expanded federal jurisdiction
of class action litigation. Proponents of CAFA argue that this act bodes well for firms,
while the opponents argue that CAFA’s affect is negative on firms. The major purpose
of this dissertation is threefold: 1) to determine the magnitude and direction of impact of
CAFA on relevant firms, 2) to examine if firms that are more exposed to product liability
type suits are more sensitive than those more exposed to contract liability type suits to
CAFA, and 3) to investigate the extent to which internal corporate governance tools
explain the cross-sectional variations in market reaction to CAFA for the firms in the
product liability portfolio.
The results suggest that the market perceives CAFA to contain positive
information for relevant firms. Consistent with our second hypothesis, we also find that
firms in the product liability portfolio are more sensitive to CAFA than those in the
contract liability portfolio. We find strong evidence that shareholders of firms in the
product liability portfolio react negatively at the news of delay (and the possibility that
the CAFA-related legislation may not pass) on June 8, 2004 when Senator Frist delays
consideration of the legislation. On the other hand, the market reaction for the same
group of firms is strongly positive on February 17, 2005 when CAFA is passed by the
House of Representatives. Our joint test confirms these results as it finds our average
abnormal returns to be jointly non-zero and not equal across the product liability and
contract litigation portfolios.
Our cross-sectional analysis supports the conclusion that market reaction to
CAFA varies across firms in the product liability portfolio depending on some of the
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firm’s inherent characteristics. We find that a firm’s system of internal corporate
governance plays an important role in explaining the firm’s CAR which is positively
related to the number of analysts following the firm and its debt to asset ratio, but
negatively related to the governance structure in which a firm’s CEO also serve as
Chairman of its board. The market reacts positively when a firm has higher possibility of
bankruptcy or when it is highly profitable.
CAFA increased federal jurisdiction and changed a means of external corporate
governance. Ultimately, the market reaction indicates that firms likely to be involved in
product liability class action benefit more than firms likely to be involved in contract
class action litigation. However, our cross sectional analysis indicates that those firms
with better internal corporate governance structures and less agency conflict experience
greater increases in shareholder wealth to CAFA.
Finding that shareholder wealth increases for firms we identify as likely to be
involved in product liability class actions indicates the market perceives state courts as
less friendly venues than federal courts for adjudicating cases. We test this directly by
looking at CARs when class actions are remanded to state court from federal court. We
find confirmation of our earlier results examining cases during the four years preceding
CAFA. To our knowledge this is the first time anyone has directly tested forum price
effects around class action litigation.
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Appendix A: Pending Federal Cases
This table reports the number of Federal cases pending by year and the top 5 frequencies of class
actions by Nature of Suit (NOS). The NOS codes are Securities, Commodities, and Exchange (850),
Other Statutory Actions (890), Employee Retirement Security Income Act (791), Fair Labor Standards Act
(710), Civil Rights Jobs (442), Other Civil Rights (440), Antitrust (410), Asbestos Personal Injury (368)
and Product Liability Personal Injury (365).
Year

N

Class Actions

2001

232,800

4,563

2002

265,926

4,835

2003

261,065

4,977

2004

267,270

5,535

2005

266,216

5,356

Source: Federal Court Case Integrated Database
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Class Action
Frequency
by NOS
850 (46.3%)
890 (9.2%)
440 (5.9%)
410 (5.8%)
365 (5.3%)
850 (48.1%)
890 (8.9%)
365 (6.4%)
440 (5.5%)
410 (5.1%)
850 (47%)
890 (8.7%)
365 (7.5%)
440 (4.9%)
410 (4.6%)
850 (41.7%)
890 (10.4%)
365 (8.2%)
440 (4.8%)
791 (4.7%)
850 (39.6%)
890 (10.4%)
365 (7.3%)
410 (5.1%)
440 (5.0%)
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